European solidarity?: explaining EU citizens’ attitudes towards economic redistribution in the age of Brexit

What’s happening to European solidarity in the wake of Brexit? In this blog, Nicholas Charron and Monika Bauhr (University of Gothenburg) explains EU citizens’ attitudes towards cohesion policy. They find that less than one-half of EU citizens have even heard of the policy itself, while roughly one-third claim they have ‘benefitted from some EU project in their area’. They also observe that attitudes on support for EU economic integration have a lot to do with how people see home institutions and the degree of their European identity

Perceptions of quality of government and support for Marine Le Pen in the 2022 French presidential election

Support for Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election differed substantially across the country. Using data from the European Quality of Government Index, Nicholas Charron and Monika Bauhr show that Le Pen won a greater share of support in areas where citizens are dissatisfied with the delivery of public services

¿Apoyan los ciudadanos la política de cohesión de la UE? Medida del apoyo europeo a la redistribución dentro de la UE

As the European Union enters into the next decade, its leaders seemingly strive towards more future integration rather than less, despite the recent setback of Brexit and the rise of anti-EU populist parties. In his state of the Union in 2018, Jean Claude Junker emphasized s ‘European solidarity’. One key policy ‘expression of solidary’ would be Cohesion Policy and the Structural Funds, which are “the only real, significant redistributive mechanism in the EU…” (Fratesi 2017). . Despite elite commentary, we know surprisingly little about what EU citizens think of the rationale behind the policy of Cohesion – e.g. economic redistribution within the EU. As part of the PERCEIVE Horizon2020 project, we launched a unique survey to investigate how citizens feel about economic integration within the Union, where 17,200 citizens were interviewed. In this paper, we show how we measure support for the policy, the results as well as a host of correlates. Our analysis shows the variation in citizens’ support for EU Cohesion policy between countries, how support varies between demographic groups, as well as the extent to which support is correlated with utilitarian and ideational factors as well as cue taking. Implications for future developments of this policy are discussed.A medida que la Unión Europea ingresa en la próxima década, sus líderes aparentemente luchan por más integración futura en lugar de menos, a pesar del reciente revés del Brexit y el surgimiento de los partidos populistas anti-UE. En su estado de la Unión en 2018, Jean Claude Junker hizo hincapié en la "solidaridad europea". Una política clave de "expresión de solidaridad" sería la Política de Cohesión y los Fondos Estructurales, que son "el único mecanismo redistributivo real y significativo en la UE..." (Fratesi 2017). A pesar de las opiniones de la élite, sorprendentemente sabemos poco sobre lo que piensan los ciudadanos de la UE sobre la lógica detrás de la Política de Cohesión, de la redistribución económica dentro de la UE. Como parte del proyecto PERCEIVE Horizon2020, llevamos a cabo una encuesta única para investigar cómo se sienten los ciudadanos acerca de la integración económica dentro de la Unión, entrevistando a 17.200 ciudadanos. En este documento, mostramos cómo medimos el apoyo a la política, los resultados y una serie de elementos relacionados. Nuestro análisis muestra la variación en el apoyo de los ciudadanos a la política de cohesión de la UE entre países, cómo varía el apoyo entre los grupos demográficos, así como la medida en la que el apoyo se correlaciona con factores utilitarios e ideológicos. Se discuten las implicaciones para futuros desarrollos de esta política

Do Men and Women Perceive Corruption Differently? Gender Differences in Perception of Need and Greed Corruption

Do men and women perceive corruption differently? While evidence suggest that there is a strong link between gender and corruption, and that gender differences can at least partly be derived from men and women having different attitudes towards corruption, most studies to date focus on gender differences in perceptions of the scale or severity of the corruption in general, rather than its different forms. However, we argue that factors such as role socialization, social status and life experiences may make men and women perceive different kinds of corruption. Drawing on the distinction between ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption, we suggest that women are more likely than men to perceive that corruption is driven by need rather than greed. In particular, women may be more likely to be exposed to need corruption because of their greater care taking responsibilities both in the professional and private sphere, and, much in line with marginalization theory, have easier access to forms of corruption that are less dependent upon embeddedness in collusive networks. Using unique survey data, we show that women and men indeed differ in their perceptions of need vs. greed, and that women perceive more need corruption, while men perceive more greed corruption. This suggests that perceptions of different forms of corruption are indeed gendered and we discuss the implication of this for anti-corruption policy

Small is Different Size, Political Representation and Governance

In the theoretical literature on government design, few variables have received more attention than the size of the polity. Since Plato’s famous prediction that the optimal size of a political unit should be 5040 free citizens, the list of thinkers concerned about state size would include Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many of the founding fathers, among many others. One of the fathers of modern political science, Robert Dahl, devoted great attention to what he called the “elemental question of what is appropriate unit for a democratic political system … Among the vast number of theoretically possible ways of dividing up the inhabitants of this globe into more or less separate political systems, … are there any principles that instruct us as to how one ought to bound some particular collection of people, in order that they may rule themselves?” (Dahl 1967: 953). Economists have not neglected these issues, as they conform the core of the fiscal federalism literature (Oates 1972). A more recent literature, pioneered by Alesina and Spolaore’s work (1997, 2003), provides an elegant formal theoretical framework incorporating both political and economic elements in order to highlight the fundamental trade-off that the choice of the size of the policy inevitably faces: Large polities find it easier to provide more public goods, but confront the costly political problem of greater heterogeneity of preferences among the population

Uncooperative society, uncooperative politics or both? Trust, polarization, populism and COVID-19 deaths across European regions

Why have some territories performed better than others in the fight against COVID-19? This paper uses a novel dataset on excess mortality, trust and political polarization for 165 European regions to explore the role of social and political divisions in the remarkable regional differences in excess mortality during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we investigate whether regions characterized by a low social and political trust witnessed a higher excess mortality. Second, we argue that it is not only levels, but also polarization in trust among citizens – in particular, between government supporters and non-supporters – that matters for understanding why people in some regions have adopted more pro-healthy behaviour. Third, we explore the partisan make-up of regional parliaments and the relationship between political division – or what we refer to as ‘uncooperative politics’. We hypothesize that the ideological positioning – in particular those that lean more populist – and ideological polarization among political parties is also linked to higher mortality. Accounting for a host of potential confounders, we find robust support that regions with lower levels of both social and political trust are associated with higher excess mortality, along with citizen polarization in institutional trust in some models. On the ideological make-up of regional parliaments, we find that, ceteris paribus, those that lean more ‘tan’ on the ‘GAL-TAN’ spectrum yielded higher excess mortality. Moreover, although we find limited evidence of elite polarization driving excess deaths on the left-right or GAL-TAN spectrums, partisan differences on the attitudes towards the European Union demonstrated significantly higher deaths, which we argue proxies for (anti)populism. Overall, we find that both lower citizen-level trust and populist elite-level ideological characteristics of regional parliaments are associated with higher excess mortality in European regions during the first wave of the pandemic

Cambio y continuidad en la calidad de gobierno: tendencias en la calidad de gobierno subnacional en los estados miembros de la UE

Despite massive investments, studies suggest that anticorruption efforts often times fail and that countries and regions with historically deficient quality of government tend to be stuck in a vicious cycle of high levels of corruption and inadequate public service delivery. However, this study suggests that despite the stickiness of subnational quality of government, regional quality of government does shift over time. Using the 2021 European Quality of Government Index (EQI), and comparing the results to previous rounds of this survey, we show that there has indeed been noticeable shifts in the regional level of Quality of Government both within countries and across time. Overall, we find a slight increase in the perceived quality of government of European regions compared with 2017. However, some regions have evaded the positive trend, most notably in Poland and Hungary, whose response to the pandemic – probably not coincidentally – has involved important infringements of democratic rights and institutions. These changes in Quality of government call for a close mapping of the trends within countries and across regions and a focus on their determinants. To this end, the paper also serves as an introduction to the use of 2021 European Quality of Government (EQI) index, which is the most comprehensive survey to date to measure perceptions of subnational quality of government with a total of 129,000 respondents in 208 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions and all EU 27-member state countries.A pesar de masivas inversiones económicas, los estudios sugieren que los esfuerzos anticorrupción a menudo fracasan y que los países y regiones con una calidad de gobierno históricamente deficiente tienden a quedar atrapados en un círculo vicioso de altos niveles de corrupción y una prestación inadecuada de los servicios públicos. Sin embargo, este artículo sugiere que, a pesar de cierta continuidad en la calidad de gobierno a nivel subnacional, hay cambios sustanciales a lo largo del tiempo. Usando el Índice Europeo de Calidad de Gobierno (EQI) de 2021, y comparando los resultados con oleadas anteriores de esta encuesta, mostramos que, de hecho, ha habido modificaciones notables en el nivel regional de Calidad de Gobierno tanto dentro de los países como a través del tiempo. En general, encontramos un ligero aumento en la percepción ciudadana de la calidad de gobierno de las regiones europeas en comparación con 2017. No obstante, algunas regiones han evadido esta tendencia positiva, sobre todo en Polonia y Hungría, países cuya respuesta a la pandemia, probablemente no por casualidad, ha implicado importantes violaciones de los derechos ciudadanos y libertades democráticas. Estos cambios en la calidad de gobierno exigen un análisis más detallado de las tendencias dentro de cada país, así como de sus causas. Con este objetivo, este artículo también sirve como introducción al uso de la edición de 2021 del Índice Europeo de Calidad de Gobierno (EQI), que es la encuesta más completa hasta la fecha para medir las percepciones ciudadanas de la calidad de gobierno subnacional con un total de 129,000 encuestados en 208 regiones NUTS 1 y NUTS 2, y de los 27 estados miembros de la UE

Temporally Coherent Backmapping of Molecular Trajectories From Coarse-Grained to Atomistic Resolution

Coarse-graining offers a means to extend the achievable time and length scales of molecular dynamics simulations beyond what is practically possible in the atomistic regime. Sampling molecular configurations of interest can be done efficiently using coarse-grained simulations, from which meaningful physicochemical information can be inferred if the corresponding all-atom configurations are reconstructed. However, this procedure of backmapping to reintroduce the lost atomistic detail into coarse-grain structures has proven a challenging task due to the many feasible atomistic configurations that can be associated with one coarse-grain structure. Existing backmapping methods are strictly frame-based, relying on either heuristics to replace coarse-grain particles with atomic fragments and subsequent relaxation or parametrized models to propose atomic coordinates separately and independently for each coarse-grain structure. These approaches neglect information from previous trajectory frames that is critical to ensuring temporal coherence of the backmapped trajectory, while also offering information potentially helpful to producing higher-fidelity atomic reconstructions. In this work, we present a deep learning-enabled data-driven approach for temporally coherent backmapping that explicitly incorporates information from preceding trajectory structures. Our method trains a conditional variational autoencoder to nondeterministically reconstruct atomistic detail conditioned on both the target coarse-grain configuration and the previously reconstructed atomistic configuration. We demonstrate our backmapping approach on two exemplar biomolecular systems: alanine dipeptide and the miniprotein chignolin. We show that our backmapped trajectories accurately recover the structural, thermodynamic, and kinetic properties of the atomistic trajectory data

Machine learning implicit solvation for molecular dynamics

Accurate modeling of the solvent environment for biological molecules is crucial for computational biology and drug design. A popular approach to achieve long simulation time scales for large system sizes is to incorporate the effect of the solvent in a mean-field fashion with implicit solvent models. However, a challenge with existing implicit solvent models is that they often lack accuracy or certain physical properties compared to explicit solvent models as the many-body effects of the neglected solvent molecules are difficult to model as a mean field. Here, we leverage machine learning (ML) and multi-scale coarse graining (CG) in order to learn implicit solvent models that can approximate the energetic and thermodynamic properties of a given explicit solvent model with arbitrary accuracy, given enough training data. Following the previous ML–CG models CGnet and CGSchnet, we introduce ISSNet, a graph neural network, to model the implicit solvent potential of mean force. ISSNet can learn from explicit solvent simulation data and be readily applied to molecular dynamics simulations. We compare the solute conformational distributions under different solvation treatments for two peptide systems. The results indicate that ISSNet models can outperform widely used generalized Born and surface area models in reproducing the thermodynamics of small protein systems with respect to explicit solvent. The success of this novel method demonstrates the potential benefit of applying machine learning methods in accurate modeling of solvent effects for in silico research and biomedical applications